School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of
Government Responsibility
Eighteen years ago, Brown v. Board of Education1 condemned segregated schools as inherently inferior. After hundreds of desegregation
cases, most black children continue to attend segregated schools, 2 which
remain inferior. 3 Although the reasons for this failure are numerous
and complex, 4 one persistent problem has been the inability of courts
to develop consistent standards for determining the constitutionality
of a school system in which racial imbalance exists. In April, 1971, in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,5 the Supreme
Court finally articulated some guidelines to assist lower courts in
making this determination. The Court focused primarily on the remedial devices, including busing and assignment by race, that could appropriately be used to overcome state-imposed segregation. The Court
did not, however, provide any significant guidance for determining
when segregation should be considered "state-imposed." 6 Consequently,
this question remains enveloped in uncertainty.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC

SCHOOLS 2-7

(1967) [hereinafter cited as RACIAL. ISOLATION]. Recent statistics indicate increased progress;
but as of 1970, approximately fifty percent of black students still attended all- or almost
all-black schools. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, News Release, June 18, 1971.
8 It is dear that the inferiority of black schools cannot be attributed to any one factor.
Those factors mentioned most often include (1)underallocation of resources to the
minority group school, (2) lack of contact with students from advantaged socioeconomic
backgrounds, (3) inferiority of educational environment in the economically deprived
family, and (4) stigmatization of the black children resulting from the state-imposed or
-sanctioned racial separation. While it is true that some of these educational factors can
be overcome without integration, the continued existence of segregated school systems will
remain a barrier in the long run to meaningful integration of the races. Moreover, the
continued inferiority of black schools is strong evidence that Brown l's initial assumption
of inherent inequality was accurate, although it has been subjected to increasing criticism.
E.g., Cohen, Defining Racial Equality in Education, 16 U.C.L.A.L. R1v. 255, 258 (1969).
See generally RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 73-114; U.S. DEP'T or HEALTH, EDUCATION

&-WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY (J.Coleman

ed. 1966); Schoettie, The

Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 1355 (1971), and authorities cited therein.
4 See generally U.S. COMrM'N ON CivL RIGrrs, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 12-25 (1969); Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and

Prospects, 64 COLuM. L. REV. 193 (1964); Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the SchoolsPartI: The New Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1963).
5 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
6 See generally Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation,38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).
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The continued inability or unwillingness 7 of the Supreme Court to
give a comprehensive interpretation of the government responsibility
question has had significant repercussions. Absent a finding that the
government was somehow responsible for the segregation, a court has
no jurisdiction under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The continuing absence of a standard for determining
whether government responsibility exists has, consequently, resulted
in uneven enforcement patterns between North and South and among
school districts within those regions. This disparate treatment has
created the impression of arbitrariness8 and has undermined the credibility of a process that has never enjoyed widespread public support.9
In addition, lower courts, faced with the uncertainties of the government responsibility question, have frequently directed their attention
to the causes of segregation rather than to the only relevant subject of
inquiry-whether the costs of achieving desegregation in any given
situation outweigh the legal, moral, and educational considerations
favoring it.
This comment will study the recent attempts by courts to deal with
the question of government responsibility and will suggest a standard
that would provide a consistent and workable approach to the problem.
Section I discusses general theories of government responsibility in
the school desegregation context. Section II analyzes the continued
absence of a standard for government responsibility by examining lower
court decisions after Swann with respect to three overlapping aspects
of the problem: (1) neighborhood schools, (2) school district lines, and
(3)dismantling of formerly dual systems. Finally, section III suggests
7 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari numerous times in school desegregation cases
that squarely raise questions of government responsibility. E.g., Davis v. School Dist.,
443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d
988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d
86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). But see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d
990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,92 S.Ct. 707 (1972).
8 See Georgia v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1971). A suit brought by the
State of Georgia alleging uneven enforcement of desegregation laws between North and
South was dismissed by the court on grounds that enforcement was within the domain of
prosecutorial discretion and that segregation in the North was not the product of state
action. See also Fiss, supra note 6, at 705.
9 In the 1972 Florida Primary Election, seventy-four percent of the voters favored a
constitutional amendment against court-ordered busing. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1972, at 1,
col. 1 (city ed.). Recent Harris Polls indicate that sixty-one percent of the nation feel that
dual systems are "wrong" and that only eighteen percent consider them "right." When
de facto segregation is substituted for dual systems, however, the figures are sixty percent
"right" and nineteen percent "wrong." THE HARuus SURVEY YEARBOOK OF PUaLIC OPINION
1970, at 225-26 (1971). A March, 1970 Gallup Poll found that forty-six percent of the nation
believed that racial integration had been carried out "too fast" and that only seventeen
percent thought "not fast enough." Gallup Poll Press Release, Mar. 12, 1970.
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an appropriate standard for determining whether government responsibility exists and, consequently, whether a school system meets the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
I.

GENERAL THEOUES OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RACIAL
IMBALANCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The framework within which the problem of government responsibility arises may be briefly described. An equal protection claim is made
by a black child attending a racially imbalanced public school. A racially
imbalanced school may be defined as a school attended predominantly
by blacks1 ° that has a significantly larger ratio of black to white students
than other schools in the same district or geographic area. An imbalanced school is the semantic equivalent of a segregated school. A
racially imbalanced school district may be defined as a district containing one or more imbalanced schools. A finding of a denial of equal protection can be derived from the holding in Brown I that segregated education is inherently inferior.
Racial imbalance alone is not, however, a denial of equal protection.
The fourteenth amendment further requires government responsibility for the segregation. The theories of government responsibility
that have been developed by courts dealing with this requirement have
arisen in four contexts: (1) segregation arising from the maintenance
of a dual system or vestiges thereof; (2) segregation arising from intentionally discriminatory governmental acts other than the maintenance
of a dual system; (3) segregation arising from governmental acts, the
probable effects of which were foreseeable; and (4) segregation not arising from governmental acts, but which could be remedied by positive
governmental action.
Government responsibility is established most clearly in the first
context, in which the district maintains a dual system-a system in
which, by statute or practice, students are assigned to schools explicitly
on the basis of race, resulting in one set of schools designated as white
and one set as black." Since such systems were declared unconstitu10 It is difficult to give a precise numerical figure for determining when "imbalance"
exists. Experience shows that when the percentage of blacks in a school surpasses a
certain level, there is a significant probability that the remaining whites will flee the
school. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has estimated this "tipping
point" at around forty percent. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 832 F. Supp. 655,
676-77 (SMD.Ind. 1971). See also Ditkoff, State Remedies for Racial Imbalance: Increasing
Their Educational Impact, 3 COLIJm. SuRvEy HumAN RIGHTs L. 1, 27-30 (1971); Note,
Demise of the Neighborhood School Plan,55 CoRNmtE L. R.v. 594,595 n.9 (1970).
11 The term "dual system" is often used to refer to a school system segregated through
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tional in Brown 1, all formerly dual systems have made at least token
changes in their methods of student assignment. The continued existence of imbalance in a formerly dual system can, however, be attributed
to the failure of the state to dismantle completely the dual system,
and the Supreme Court held in Swann that government responsibility
persists as long as any "vestige" of the dual system remains.
The second context relates to racial imbalance caused by school
board or other governmental acts, other than assignment of students
explicitly on the basis of race, that are intended to create or maintain
segregated schools. Included are such acts as gerrymandered attendance
zones, racially motivated faculty assignment, school site location designed to foster imbalance, and various other practices intended to
create or maintain an imbalanced system. Although the Supreme Court
has never explicitly held that such actions, absent a formerly dual
system, are sufficient to impose responsibility on the government for the
segregation, lower courts have frequently done so.
The third context pertains to segregation created by such facially
neutral school board acts as attendance zone designation or school site
location that, although not intentionally discriminatory, have the
natural and probable effect of creating or maintaining racial imbalance.
Also included are such other governmental acts as enforcement of
restrictive covenants and federal loan practices that have the foreseeable
effect of fostering residential segregation and which may subsequently
result in racially imbalanced schools. 12 The erection of school district
lines may also have the natural and probable effect of increasing imbalance where segregated residential patterns exist. Lower courts have
often found government responsibility in these practices by inferring
segregative intent from their foreseeable effects.
The fourth context encompasses what could be termed a per se
approach. Government responsibility may be based on the premise that
racially imbalanced schools are inherently unequal and that the failure
of the school board or government to remedy this unequal treatment is
a denial of equal protection regardless of the underlying causes. On this
reasoning, the intent of the conduct and the foreseeability of the effect
are irrelevant. A small but increasing number of lower courts have taken
this approach.
any form of state action. It is used here to refer only to school systems that assign students
explicitly on the basis of race.
12 The numerous methods of governmental encouragement of residential segregation
have been well documented. E.g., Hearings on Emergency School Aid Act of 1970 Before the
Subcomm. on-Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 352-54 (1970). See also Note, supra note 10, at 605 n.53 and authorities cited therein.
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The four contexts tend to overlap, and the categorization is reflective
more of the approaches taken by different courts than of actual differences in the underlying causes. Obviously, it is possible for more than
one of these factors to contribute to racial imbalance in a given situation.
II.

APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY AFTER

Swann

The attempt by the Supreme Court to deal with the government
responsibility question in Swann has engendered increased confusion
in the lower courts as to how the question should be resolved. 13 In
Swann, the Court was confronted by a school board that had made no
real effort to dismantle its formerly dual system, and this alone was
clearly sufficient to support a finding of government responsibility.
But Chief Justice Burger also pointed to numerous acts by the board,
distinct from explicit assignment by race, that had been intended to
perpetuate the segregation. The Court held that these acts, which
included school site location, attendance zone designation, and faculty
assignment, should be considered in determining whether the segregation was "state-imposed."' 4 The Court left unanswered whether and
in what circumstances these activities alone would suffice to attribute
responsibility to the government. Subsequently, lower courts have given
divergent answers to these questions and have been able to find support
in the broad, ambiguous language of Swann for almost any position
taken.' 5
A.

Neighborhood Schools
In a neighborhood school system, assignment is made on the basis of
geographic proximity, with each student generally assigned to the
school nearest his home. The courts are currently divided on the
question whether use of this facially neutral criterion absolves the
government of responsibility for racial imbalance in the school system. 16
13 Prior to the decision, there had been some speculation that the Court would use
Swann as a vehicle for clarifying many of the persistent problems. The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3,75 n.9 (1971). See also Note, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: Roadblocks to the Implementation of Brown, 12 WM. & MARy
L. REv. 838 (1971); N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1970, at 21, col. 1.
14 402 U.S. at 20-21.
'5 Compare Soria v. Oxnard, 328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971), with Goss v. Board of
Educ., 444 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1971). For commentary on how Swann affected the government
responsibility question, see Fiss, supra note 6; Comment, The Permissibility and Necessity
of Busing School Children to Attain Integrated Schools: Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Education-A Case Study, 20 KAN. L. R.v. 165, 176 (1971).
16 Earlier cases that failed to find state action in an imbalanced neighborhood system
include Deal v. Cincinnati Bd.of Educ., 869 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914
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The principal line of division centers on whether segregative intent is
required and, if so, whether any elements in addition to the mere existence of imbalance are necessary to give rise to an inference of such an
intent.
In Gomperts v. Chase,17 the plaintiffs challenged the school board's
recission of a plan that would have achieved greater balance in the
San Mateo, California school system. The district court required the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the state had been responsible for the
imbalance. An assignment policy based on geographic proximity had
created, among the six high schools in the district, one that was ninetyfour percent black. Although the board had never maintained a dual
system, the plaintiffs alleged that the segregation was caused by other
governmental acts, primarily official encouragement of residential
segregation that had the natural and probable effect of creating imbalance.18 The court first stated that a denial of equal protection could
be established if the imbalance had been "planned, encouraged, fostered,
designed, or in some way created by law or by administrative action
under the color of law." 19 This did not, however, mean that the state was
to be held responsible for the foreseeable effects of its acts. Rather,
it meant that the state's policies must have been "motivated by purposeful desire to perpetuate and maintain racially segregated schools." 20 The
court held that "the maintenance of racially imbalanced schools, as
the product of neighborhood mix or otherwise,"2 1 did not indicate such
a motivation. The court in effect granted an evidentiary presumption of
regularity to the state and placed the burden on the plaintiffs to show
intent. No presumption was created by the mere existence of imbalance.
In Bivins v. Bibb County Board of Education,22 the district court
(1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
Contra, Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961);
United States v. School Dist. 151, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
17 329 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal.), injunction pending appeal denied, 404 U.S. 1237
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971).
1S In his denial of a stay pending appeal, Justice Douglas outlined the following alleged
sources of government responsibility:
(1) California's Bayshore Freeway effectively isolated the Blacks and resulted in a
separate and predominantly Black high school. (2) State planning groups fashioned
and built the Black community around that school. (3) Realtors-licensed by the
State-kept "White property" White and "Black property" Black. (4) Banks chartered
by the State shaped the policies that handicapped Blacks in financing homes other
than in Black ghettoes. (5) Residential segregation, fostered by state enforced restrictive
covenants, resulted in segregated schools.
404 US. at 1239.
19 329 F. Supp. at 1195.
20 Id. at 1196.
21 Id. at 1195.
22

331 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Ga. 1971), rev'd, No. 71-2983 (5th Cir., May 3, 1972).
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confronted a formerly dual system in which segregation had persisted
after the adoption of a neighborhood system. The court held that the
state could not be held responsible for residential patterns since they
were the result of volitional decisions of private individuals. It refused
to consider whether past school board or other governmental acts had
been a factor in the residential segregation or whether the neighborhood
system could have been arranged so as to decrease imbalance. Again,
the use of a neutral assignment policy resulted in a strong presumption
of regularity.
While still requiring motive, an increasing number of courts have
been willing to infer intent from the foreseeability of effects of facially
neutral acts. 23 In Bradley v. Milliken,24 involving the Detroit school
system, the district court found government responsibility primarily in
various facially neutral school board and other governmental acts
that had the "natural, probable and foreseeable" effect of keeping the
schools segregated. Among these acts were Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration loan policies that encouraged
"racially and economically harmonious neighborhoods"; judical enforcement of racially restrictive covenants prior to their prohibition by the
Supreme Court in 1948; and such school board acts as altered attendance
zones, transfer programs that allowed whites to escape from identifiably
black neighborhood schools, and busing programs that operated to move
only black students out of geographically closer overcrowded white
schools into predominantly black schools with available space.
Similarly, in Davis v. School District,25 the Sixth Circuit found that
several acts of the Pontiac, Michigan school board, including school
site location, attendance zone designation, and faculty assignment, had
had the effect of perpetuating imbalance caused primarily by residential
patterns. Although there was no proof of explicit segregative intent,
the court found that the acts, "taken together... support the conclusion
that a purposeful pattern of racial discrimination existed in the Pontiac
School System." 26 The court relied on the broad language of Swann to
23 Numerous commentators have argued that segregative intent can invariably be found
in the operation of a so-called de facto imbalanced neighborhood plan. E.g., Fiss, Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 H.,v. L. REv. 564, 584
(1965): "[IMn every case of racially imbalanced schools sufficient responsibility can be
ascribed to government to satisfy the requirement that stems from the equal protection

clause's proscription of unequal treatment by government." See also Carter, De Facto
School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented,
16 W. Rrs. L. Ray. 502 (1965); Comment, Constitutionality of Adventitious Segregation
in the Public Schools, 1967 U. ILL. LF. 680.
24 338 F. Supp. 582 (EM. Mich. 1971).
25 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
26 Id. at 576.
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support its finding of government responsibility although, as in Bradley
v. Milliken, there was no history of a dual system. In both Bradley and
Davis, the existence of imbalance acted to lighten the plaintiffs' burden
of proving intent.
The confusion engendered by these diverse standards of government
responsibility was again demonstrated in Keyes v. School District
No. 1,27 in which imbalance within the Denver school system was held
to be de jure in one part of the city and de facto in another, although
the same school board administered both areas. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court finding28 that the northeast section of the city
had been segregated by several acts of the school board-gerrymandering
attendance zones, placing mobile classrooms in black areas, and locating
new schools in the center of the black community. Although no overt
intent was found, the court inferred impermissible purpose from the
absence of sufficient justification by the board for its acts. 29 As to the

core area of the city, the court upheld the district court finding that
the school board acts had not caused the severe imbalance despite the
previous finding that the board had intentionally segregated the north30
east section of the city.

The result reached by the court in Keyes seems anomalous. It is
rather improbable that the school board acts could have been wholly
neutral in one part of the city and intentionally segregative in another. Moreover, previous cases always treated the school district as a
unit; a finding that the state was responsible for imbalance in any of the
schools usually has systemwide implications.31
27 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,92 S. Ct. 707 (1972).

28 313 F. Supp. 61, 65 (D. Colo. 1970).
29 The Tenth Circuit did not rule on the additional district court finding that the
school board's recission of a plan that would have decreased the imbalance in the
northeast section was in itself a sufficient basis for finding state action. 445 F.2d at 1002.
Cases that have found racially motivated state elimination of a benign racial objective to
be violative of the fourteenth amendment include Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967);
and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). See also
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). See generally Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v.
Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39; Comment,
James v. Valtierra: Housing Discriminationby Referendum?, 39 U. Cmu. L. REv. 115 (1971).
30 In addition, the court of appeals reversed the district court determination that the
existence of inferior conditions in the black schools was in itself a violation of equal
protection. It reasoned that since it had not been shown that the school board had
intentionally created the imbalance, the board could not be held responsible for the
conditions resulting from the imbalance. 495 F.2d at 1004-05. Contra, Hobson v. Hansen,
327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971); cases cited note 40 infra.
31 E.g., Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. School Dist. 151, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968). But see United States v. Midland Independent School Dist., 334
F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Tex. 1971). See generally Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
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The inference of intent from foreseeable acts was carried quite far
in Kelly v. Guinn32 a recent Ninth Circuit decision. Despite genuine
attempts by the school board to integrate the Las Vegas area schools,
which had been balanced in 1954 and had since become segregated
primarily through shifting residential patterns, Judge Browning based
government responsibility on an inference of intent arising from four
factors: (1) the existence of almost total segregation in the elementary
schools of a racially mixed school district; (2) the pattern of faculty
assignments, through which black teachers were assigned to predominantly black schools and white teachers to predominantly white schools,
despite convincing educational justifications for the assignments proffered by the school board;33 (3) school construction policies that had
the natural effect of aggravating imbalance; and (4) the board's decision
to continue a "neighborhood" assignment policy at the elementary
level while abandoning it at the secondary level in favor of a program
designed to integrate the secondary schools.3 4
The court's authority for attribution of responsibility from the first
three factors was Swann's discussion of intentional school board activities. The court's reading of Swann is especially significant since this
case, unlike Swann, did not involve a previously dual system and in fact
involved a system that by all indications had been making a conscientious attempt at integration.3 5 The inference of intent arising from
the fourth factor, the board's failure to desegregate some of the schools,
School Dist., 448 F.2d 1392, 1395 (5th Cir. 1971) (Bell, J. dissenting) (treats question as

unresolved); Fiss, supra note 6, at 705.
32 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972).

S3 The defendants argued that the faculty assignments were educationally justifiable
because black students respond better to black teachers. Id. at 9 n.8. This argument was
accepted by the Tenth Circuit in Keyes as a justification for the assignment of black
teachers to the ghetto schools. 445 F.2d at 1007.
34 In his request for congressional action on the moratorium on school busing that he
proposed in March, 1972, President Nixon recommended that the legislation proscribe
busing for kindergarten students and students in grades one through eight and that it
allow busing as a last resort for students in grades nine through twelve. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.). Compare The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note
13, at 80:
[I]f younger students are not to be bused, they will attend the most segregated schools.
In terms of social and educational policy this may be a serious mistake. The critical
stages in children's social and educational development are the earliest elementary
school years, and if segregation does indeed do educational or social damage, early
segregation may do harm that later integration cannot heal. [Footnotes omitted.]
;35 Although busing was not used at the elementary level, the board did attempt to
achieve greater balance in the elementary schools by establishing a "prestige" school in
the black neighborhood with special programs and a low pupil-teacher ratio to which
white students were encouraged to transfer voluntarily. Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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approaches the theory that failure to reduce imbalance constitutes
government responsibility regardless of the initial cause of the imbalance.
The theory that maintenance of an imbalanced neighborhood system
is in itself a denial of equal protection 36 was adopted in People v. San
Diego Unified School District.37 The state trial court had dismissed a
mandamus brought by the state attorney general demanding that the
school board "take reasonably feasible steps to prevent, alleviate and
eliminate racial imbalance" in the schools. The school system, in which
assignment was based on the concededly neutral criterion of geographic
proximity, apparently without gerrymandering or other racially motivated acts, nevertheless had substantial imbalance. The state court of
appeals, reversing the trial court dismissal, found that the knowing
failure of the board to remedy the imbalance, when it was shown to
have resulted in inferior education for black students, was sufficient
to attribute responsibility to the state. While recognizing that the
presumption of educational inequality was rebuttable and that practical
limits might make complete integration impossible, the court ultimately
adopted an approach that would require a finding of government
responsibility in most if not all cases of imbalanced schools. Under
this approach, all evidentiary presumptions are shifted to favor the
plaintiffs; the state is required to show either equality of education
between white and black schools or the physical impossibility of
desegregation.
The problem of attributing responsibility to the government for
racial imbalance in the neighborhood school context continues to create
different results. Consistency can be achieved only through a Supreme
Court resolution of whether the mere creation or maintenance of an
imbalanced system gives rise to a duty to desegregate, as it did in the
San Diego case, or whether there must be a showing of segregative intent,
as was required in Gomperts and Keyes. If the Court determines that
intent must be shown, it must then decide whether and in what circumstances the foreseeability of the effects of school board acts should create
a presumption of intent. The remoteness of the effects of many governmental acts makes this inquiry difficult. While gerrymandering of
38 Several commentators have advocated this approach. E.g., Sedler, School Segregation
in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 228 (1963); Note, supra note 10.
See also Fiss, supra note 6.
37 19 Cal. App. d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
1288 (1972); accord, Soria v. Oxnard, 828 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Hobson v. Hansen,
327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501
(S.D. Cal. 1970); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v.

Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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attendance zones into black or white areas can clearly be a direct cause
of imbalance, other acts, such as enforcement of restrictive covenants
prior to 1948 of state licensing or real estate brokers who discriminated
in their selling practices, may affect attendance patterns only indirectly.
As long as the identification of the cause of discrimination, with its
many variables, remains a central judicial concern in the neighborhood
school context, the possibility of formulating a consistent, workable
standard will remain remote.
B.

School District Lines

The geographic definition of a school district can have the effect,
intended or otherwise, of creating racially imbalanced schools. For
example, in a county predominantly white in the western part and
predominantly black in the eastern part, a school district line dividing
the county vertically can establish two racially imbalanced school
districts. If it is assumed further that a district line drawn horizontally
would result in integrated schools, the problem of responsibility for
the segregation becomes apparent.38 If the district line has been drawn
with the intention of furthering segregation, government responsibility
is as clear as if the state had established a dual system. More difficult,
however, is the situation in which the resulting segregation was not
intended, but was foreseeable. Finally, there is the situation in which
district lines, although neutral in purpose and nonsegregative in effect
when drawn, have become a barrier to school integration as a result
of shifting residential patterns, most commonly the white flight to the
suburbs.
A second, closely related problem is whether school district lines
may be transgressed in order to achieve integration. Clearly, if district
lines are the result of segregative intent, a remedial plan could ignore
the lines and restructure the districts in order to change their racial
composition. District lines drawn independently of any racially motivated purpose present a more difficult question, to which courts have
responded in a variety of ways.
In Spencer v. Kugler,39 a three-judge district court was faced with
a challenge to a New Jersey statute establishing district lines coterminous with political boundaries. The undisputed effect of using this
neutral criterion was to create severe imbalance among neighboring
school districts in several parts of the state. The district court, finding the
boundaries reasonable and drawn without racial motivation, dismissed
33 Compare Sedler, supra note 36, at 252-54, in which this example is used in the context
of attendance zone boundaries rather than district lines.
39 826 F. Supp. 1285 (D.NJ. 1971), aff'd mem., 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972).
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the complaint on the ground that "the conditions complained of herein
are precisely those considered by the Court in Swann to be 'de facto
segregation', defined as racial imbalance that exists through no discriminatory action of state authorities." 40 The Supreme Court affirmed
summarily over the dissent of Justice Douglas. 4 ' Although the holding
can be limited to situations in which district lines coincide with
political boundaries, the clear implication is that district lines neutrally
drawn are not unconstitutional. 42
While the result in Spencer can be partly justified on the theory that
the district lines did not create imbalance when first drawn, other cases
have approved lines whose immediate effect was to increase imbalance.
In a recent series of cases involving the separation of predominantly
white districts from larger preexisting districts that had been predominantly black,43 the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the
school board acts as nonsegregative in two of the three cases, even
though the probable effect of the redistricting in all of the cases was to
increase the imbalance.44 The majority held that the Constitution is
violated only where segregation was the primary purpose for the
modification of districts and found sufficient legitimate educational
reasons45 to overcome any inference that discrimination had been the
primary purpose. The majority and dissent disagreed primarily on the
degree of scrutiny to which the board's acts should be subjected. In his
dissent, Judge Sobeloff suggested that the justifications for acts having
foreseeable segregative effects should be measured against a compelling
40 Id. at 1242.
41 In his dissent, Justice Douglas pointed to the many official decisions, such as those concerning FHA loan practices, public housing location, zoning, and enforcement of restrictive
covenants, as examples of segregative governmental acts that render the concept of de facto
segregation meaningless. By finding "a right to education in the environment of a multiracial community" equal to the right to vote, Justice Douglas used the reapportionment
cases as precedent for his argument that redistricting was required. 92 S. Ct. at 707-10.
See also note 57 infra.

42 The three-judge court decision was held res judicata in a later suit in the district
court demanding simply that the state alleviate the imbalance. Spencer v. Kugler, 454 F.2d
889 (3d Cir. 1972).
43 Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert.
granted, 404 U.S. 820 (1971); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d
575 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 821 (1971); Turner v. Littleton-Lake
Gaston School Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
44 Only the Turner case upset the redistricting on the basis of a primary discriminatory

motive. Cf. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969); Bureson v. County
Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 808 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 482 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1970).
45 The reasons put forward by the school board in the Scotland Neck case were a desire
for more local control, a desire to raise property taxes in the new district in order to
increase school expenditures, and a fear that white flight from the predominantly black
countywide system would make integration impossible. 442 F2d at 580-81.
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state interest standard, 40 and he found that the board's justification
fell far short of that standard. By placing the heavy burden of proving
intent on the plaintiff, the Fourth Circuit in effect foreclosed the possibility of ever crossing the newly formed district lines to achieve greater
balance among the districts.
A contrary approach was apparently taken by the Fifth Circuit
recently in Lee v. Macon County,47 which involved the secession of a
city from a county school system, creating a separate school district that
contained a larger proportion of whites than the county district. Rejecting the city's proffered educational justification, Judge Wisdom
ordered the reconsolidation of the districts without the extended search
for a dominant racial motive that the Fourth Circuit had required
in an almost identical situation two months earlier.48 He concluded that
"the city cannot secede from the county where the effect-to say nothing
of the purpose-of the secession has a substantial adverse effect on desegration of the county school district.

'49

While Lee involved an obvious attempt to create new imbalanced
school districts, 50 the recent decision in Bradley v. School Board51 transgressed district lines to remedy preexisting imbalance. In ordering the
consolidation of the predominantly black Richmond school district
with two predominantly white suburban districts, Judge Merhige found
literally every form of government responsibility to help justify his
massive interdistrict integration order.5 2 With respect to the district
48 "If challenged state action has a racially discriminatory effect, it violates the equal
protection clause unless a compelling and overriding legitimate state interest is demonstrated." Id. at 595. Judge Sobeloff criticized the majority's use of a primary purpose test
as being too illusive and lenient.
47 448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971), reaff'd, 455 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972).
48 In fact, Judge Wisdom cited the two district court cases that were reversed by the
Fourth Circuit in the Wright-Scotland Neck decisions as authority for his holding. 448
F.2d at 752.
49 Id.
50 The court in Lee explicitly stated: "It is unnecessary to decide whether longestablished and racially untainted boundaries may be disregarded in dismantling school
segregation." Id.
51 Civil No. 3353 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1972).
52 Aside from the existence of an undismantled dual system in Richmond, the court
found both intentional and foreseeable school board acts with segregative effects. In
addition, the court noted that "[i]f there is public education it must . . . be afforded to
all on an equal basis," id. at 87, and since the court further held that integration was an
essential element in securing equal education, a virtual per se approach was expounded.
Professor Fiss, referring to this kind of massive fault finding in a desegregation order
that will obviously entail great costs, has said: "A court aware of these costs is likely to
feel a need to justify its action in terms that have the quality of a moral imperative." Fiss,
supra note 6, at 698. The Richmond case, with its massive interdistrict busing order, seems
to be a perfect example of this phenomenon. In the Detroit case, Judge Roth concluded:
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lines, the court found three rationales for government responsibility:
(1) the state had formerly operated a statewide dual system, of which
the district lines were a vestige; 58 (2) maintenance of the district lines
had had the foreseeable effect of creating imbalance; 4 and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the use of the district lines, as well as their
foreseeable effect, supported a finding of deliberate discrimination in
the maintenance of the lines.r5
By viewing the existence of the district lines as a continuing act
even if the segregative effect was unintended and unforeseeable, the
state may be held responsible for the imbalance and be required to
cross district lines or to consolidate districts. This is essentially the
approach taken by the Supreme Court in the reapportionment cases, 50
in which the Court found a denial of equal protection in the continued
existence of political district lines that had the effect of depriving
individuals of an "equal" vote.57 Grossing district lines or consolidating
districts can be further justified if equal educational opportunity is
viewed as an obligation of the state and not just of the individual districts. Decisions invalidating the use of the local property tax to finance
public education are based on this view.5 8 Applying this statewide
"In the most realistic sense, if fault or blame must be found it is that of the community
as a whole, including, of course, the black components.... There is enough blame for
everyone to share." Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
53 Civil No. 3853, at 44-58; cf. Calhoun v. Cook, 322 F. Supp. 804, 809 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
rev'd, No. 71-2622 (5th Cir., Oct. 21, 1971) (court of appeals remanded to the district court
to study the possibility of consolidating the Atlanta school system with a surburban
system). See also Harrington v. Colquit City Bd. of Educ., No. 71-2626 (5th Cir., Oct. 28,
1971); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 882 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971); United
States v. Texas, 821 F. Supp. 1043, 30 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd in part, modified
in part,447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971).
54 "School officials in Virginia cannot plead ignorance of the crucial role race plays in
education. When their acts perpetuate segregation or by new devices create it anew,
their legality will be gauged by their natural, probable, and foreseeable effect." Civil
No. 353, at 62-63.
55 Id. at 83.
56 Eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583 (1964).

57 See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of ConstitutionalJurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 583, 585-86 (1968). Cases using the reapportionment
analogy to justify the crossing of district lines include Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410
F.2d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1969); Bradley v. School Bd., Civil No. 8858, at 64 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5,
1972); and Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 500, 279 A.2d 619,
628 (1971). See also RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 259.
58 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 40 U.S.L.W. 2228 (D. Minn., Oct. 12, 1971); Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d
187 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1972). But see Mcnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
aff'd per curiam, 894 U.S. 322 (1969). See generally CooNs, CLUNE, & SUOArAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PuBnc EDUCATION 350-52 (1970); Shoettle, supra note 3.
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obligation of equality to the problem of imbalance would require a
court to look beyond the district lines to determine the existence of and
fashion a remedy for imbalance.
This approach was followed recently in Jenkins v. Township of Morris
School District,59 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
even where segregation in the formation of districts has not been intentional, "governmental subdivisions of the state may readily be bridged
when necessary to vindicate state constitutional rights and policies." 60
While the decision was permissive rather than mandatory with respect
to the district lines, the case provides additional support for holding
segregative district lines to be per se denials of equal protection. 61
C.

Formerly Dual Systems

The question of the formerly dual system that has adopted a neutral
assignment policy warrants separate examination since courts may
apply a different standard to this situation than to one in which a dual
system never existed. Courts may hold racial imbalance to be a per se
violation of equal protection in the context of a dual system and apply
a less strict rule in other contexts. Under such a per se rule, the former
policy of assignment explicitly on the basis of race would be sufficient
to attribute responsibility to the government for any continued imbalance.
The use of a per se rule is supported by Green v. New Kent County
School Board,62 in which the Supreme Court held that a school board
59 58 NJ. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971), noted in 3 SEroN HAm. L. REv. 259 (1971).
60 Id. at 500, 279 A.2d at 629.
01 The legal significance of state lines as impediments to integration was dealt with
in Bullock v. Washington, No. 24,862 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 19, 1972), in which the court refused
to strike down a congressional statute that removed funds from a program that had paid
for the busing of black students from all-black District of Columbia schools into various
white districts in Maryland that had voluntarily offered the program. Over a strong
dissent by Judge Robinson, the court concluded that since the equal protection clause

speaks in
education
order the
legislative
Inasmuch

terms only of a state's denial of equal protection, there is no right to equal
beyond the borders of each state. The opinion implied that a court could never
crossing of state lines to overcome imbalance and, in addition, sanctioned a
act that had the practical effect of making even a voluntary crossing impossible.
as the District of Columbia schools are ninety-seven percent black, the decision

precludes any possibility of their achieving integration. The court's statement that "the
relevant unit of equality as it were, is, at least in the context of public education no
larger than the state" and further that "relevant units, of course, may be smaller than
state wide," id. at 15 & n.28, reflects the judicial uncertainty about this question. The
dissent argued that the removal of funds was a legislative act that had the foreseeable
effect of denying black children the means to integrate and should therefore be held an
unconstitutional, racially motivated legislative act. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
02 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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has an affirmative duty to dismantle a dual system and that the adoption
of a freedom-of-choice plan that fails to eradicate imbalance does not
satisfy this obligation. In Swann, the Court struck down an assignment
plan based on geographic proximity where the effect was perpetuation
of the imbalance of a formerly dual system. Since Swann involved a
totally noncompliant school board that had continued to operate the
system in a discriminatory fashion, it remains uncertain whether imbalance alone in the formerly dual system would have supported the
decision.
At what point a dual system is sufficiently dismantled to become
"unitary" remains a great mystery. 3 The difficuties in making this
determination were compounded by the ambiguous remarks of Chief
Justice Burger at the end of the Swann opinion:
At some point, these school authorities and others like them
should have achieved full compliance with this Court's decision
in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the sense
required by our decisions in Green and Alexander.
It does not follow that the communities served by such systems
will remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile
society, few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts
are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of
the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty
to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system. This does
not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with
future problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the
school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately
attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial
composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court
should not be necessary.A4
Some courts, interpreting "compliance" to mean only that the overt
vestiges of a dual system must be eradicated, have upheld neighborhood
systems in which imbalance persists, ostensibly because of segregated
residential patterns65 or white exodus from the school system. 66 These
63 This question has been termed "the central riddle of the law of school desegregation."
Fiss, supra note 6, at 697; see Craven, Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary-Brown
Rides North, Maybe, 73 W. VA. L. Rav. 1 (1971); Comment, Busing, Swanm v. CharlotteMecklenburg and the Future of Desegregation in the Fifth Circuit, 49 TEx. L. REv. 884,
886-95 (1971).
64 402 U.S. at 31-32. It has been suggested that this passage of the Court's opinion may
have been included as a compromise in order to insure a unanimous vote. Fiss, supra
note 6, at 703 n.11.
65 E.g., Bivins v. Bibb County Bd. of Educ., 331 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
66 E.g., Boyd v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Bd., 332 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. La. 1971).
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courts have distinguished Swann on the ground that it involved a totally
noncompliant school board that had made no genuine effort to integrate. 67 Limiting Swann to a "bad man" theory permits perpetuation of
imbalance in a formerly dual system simply by institution of a neutral
neighborhood assignment policy.
Other courts have reached the same result by limiting the concept
of "vestiges of a dual system" to exclude the mere persistence of racial
imbalance. In Bivins v. Bibb County Board of Education,8 the plaintiff
blacks applied to the district court for additional relief after the Swann
decision. Despite the prior maintenance of a dual system and the continued imbalance, the court held the system to be unitary since the
overtly racial criteria of the dual system had been eliminated. Citing
the previously quoted passage from Swann as support, the court stated:
All racial barriers have been removed from the Bibb County
School system and from every school in it. The schoolhouse doors
are open to all, completely without discrimination. Housing patterns are not vestiges of state-imposed school segregation. Similar
housing patterns exist throughout the nation in areas where school
segregation is said to be de facto rather than de jure. .

.

. The

demography of other sections of this nation teaches us that this
imbalance would be here today in Bibb County if there never
had been state-imposed segregation. 69
Similarly, in Boyd v. Pointe Coupee ParishSchool Board,70 a motion
for supplemental relief filed by the United States after Swann was
-denied by the district court. Under a previously ordered plan, "all
students were assigned to schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis,"
and if the plan had been adhered to, there would have been substantial
balance. Most of the white students, however, subsequently left the
public schools to attend private schools, creating severe imbalance in the
public system, which the court termed "resegregation." The court
denied relief on the ground that the "re-establishment of colored
schools.., has in no way been brought about by State action," but was
"purely de facto in nature." 71 The court failed to consider whether
67 E.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 444 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1971) (prior finding of a unitary
system held res judicata even though imbalance remained and many of the remedial
devices ordered in Swann had not been tried); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 444 F.2d 1179
(6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Board of Educ., 331 F. Supp. 466 (ND. Ga. 1971); Green v.
School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Va. 1971), rev'd in part sub nom. Adams v. School Dist.
No. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc); Trahan v. Lafayette Parish School Bd., 30
F. Supp. 450 (W.D. La. 1971).
68 331 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Ga. 1971), rev'd, No. 71-2983 (5th Cir., May 3, 1972).
69 Id. at 14.
70 332 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. La. 1971).
71 Id. at 994-95.
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the plan itself had caused the departure of the whites or whether a
different plan could be attempted that would avoid this result. It might
well be true that integration is impossible in Pointe Coupee Parish;
however, it does seem questionable that the state was in no way responsible for the imbalance.
A contrary approach was taken by the district court in the second
hearing after the Supreme Court's remand in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg litigation. 72 The school board claimed that the resegregation that
had occurred after an approved plan had been put into effect was de
facto. Judge McMillan found that, despite the adoption of a plan of
neutral assignment, "[r]acial discrimination through official action has
not ended in this school system.178 The court imposed an obligation
on the school board to prevent resegregation for an indefinite period
of time. Similarly, in the Richmond case, Judge Merhige responded
unfavorably to an assertion that the resegregation there was de facto
since a formerly all-white school had become all-black after integration
was attempted: "To say that such schools are 'resegregated' implies not
unfairly the continued official involvement in the creation and maintenance of schools identified as intended for one race." 74
The broad "all vestiges" language 5 and comprehensive remedial
order of the Supreme Court in Swann has been used as support for
the proposition that any imbalance in a formerly dual system constitutes a prima facie showing that the dual system has not been dismantled. In Monroe v. Board of Commissioners,76 the Jackson, Tennessee school board had adopted a neighborhood plan and had been
making "substantial progress" toward desegregation. Since the board
had not, however, utilized many of the remedial devices recommended
in Swann, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
consider the possibility of using any or all of these devices to achieve
maximum desegregation. 77 This approach, whereby a school system is
unable to claim that all vestiges are removed as long as further integration is possible, was approved by the Fifth Circuit in Dandridgev.
Jefferson Parish School Board.78 The district court, admitting that the
72

Swann v. Charlotte-Meckldenburg Bd. of Educ., 334 F. Supp. 623 (W.D.N.C. 1971).

73 Id.

at 629.

74 Bradley v. School Bd., Civil No. 3353, at 22 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1972).
75 "The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of

state-imposed segregation." 402 U.S. at 15.
76 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1972).
77 Cf. Adams v. School Dist. No. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1971) (en band); Robinson
v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1971); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 329
F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Mines v. Duval County School Bd., 329 F. Supp. 123 (M.D.
Fla.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971).
78 332 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-2542 (5th Cir., Feb. 11, 1972).
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point of compliance "may not be easily discernible," held that the continued attendance of twenty-one percent of black students in severely
imbalanced schools constituted a prima facie showing that the dual
system had not been dismantled.7 9
An approach suggesting that a formerly dual system does not completely abandon its affirmative duty even after achieving a unitary
system was taken by the Fifth Circuit in Lemon v. Bossier ParishSchool
Board. 0 The court refused to allow the school board to use achievement
testing for placement purposes despite the admitted fact that a unitary
system had been achieved. The court refused to find the achievement
testing per se invalid, but rather held that a system that had been
"unitary" for only one semester was not free of its duty to desegregate. 8 '
Two basic questions relating to the existence of government responsibility in a racially imbalanced, formerly dual system must be resolved.
First, if "all vestiges" of the dual system must be removed, what
constitutes a "vestige"? While the Green case held that adoption of a
neutral assignment policy is not enough in itself to constitute dismantling of a dual system, dicta in Swann imply that a "unitary system"
may contain some imbalance.8 2 Although it is questionable whether the
affirmative duty to maintain a balanced system should ever be removed
from a formerly dual system in which continuing imbalance can be
avoided, Swann seems to have suggested that this might be possible.
Second, in what circumstances should other governmental acts that
foster segregation be sufficient to attribute responsibility if racial imbalance continues in a formerly dual system? Swann's discussion of
deliberate school board acts implicitly supports at least some inquiry
into other types of segregative activity,83 and the Richmond case demon79 Cf. Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., No. 71-3028 (5th Cir., Feb. 23, 1972)
(continued existence of a one-race school in itself negates any claim that the dual system
has been eliminated despite the fact that the system was integrated "on paper'). In Swann,
the Supreme Court explicitly held that where one-race schools remain in a formerly dual
system, the burden of showing that the racial composition is not the result of present or
past discriminatory conduct is shifted to the school authorities. 402 U.S. at 26. This
burden has been viewed as "a heavy one." Fiss, supranote 6, at 701.
80 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
81 Accord, Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972).
82 "The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every
school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system
as a whole." 402 U.S. at 24. See also Vinston-Salem/Forsyth Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S.
1221, 1228-31 (Burger, Circuit Justice, 1971).
83 The Court specifically limited its holding to school board activities:
We do not reach in this case the question whether a showing that school segregation
is a consequence of other types of state action, without any discriminatory action by
the school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial action by a
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strates the breadth of the search made by some courts. Other cases,
however, focus solely on whether the dual system has been dismantled
and do not consider whether other school board or governmental acts
have contributed to continuing imbalance. Certainly, it is anomalous
to apply a very narrow standard of government responsibility in a
formerly dual system while other courts are finding government responsibility in systems in which the initial cause of the imbalance was almost
entirely fortuitous. Comparison of such cases as Boyd or Bivins with
Kelley v. Guinn or Bradley v. Milliken illustrates this anomaly.
III. RACIAL IMBALANCE: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY AND
TiE DuTY TO DESEGREGATE
A. A Uniform Theory of Government Responsibility
Although the inability of the lower courts to achieve a consensus may
in large measure be attributed to the predilections of individual
judges,8 4 the adoption of a uniform, coherent standard of government
responsibility by the Supreme Court is a necessary step toward achieving
greater consistency. The standard proposed here avoids illusive questions
of motive 5 and causation and focuses on the ability of a school board to
achieve greater integration without sacrificing other important values.
The appropriate standard should be that responsibility attaches, regardless of actual intent, where a school board fails to remedy avoidable
racial imbalance. Since public school attendance is compulsory and the
state has complete control over attendance zone designation, school
site location, student assignment, and all other components of a school
system, it seems proper to hold the state accountable for harm caused
by the school system that the state might reasonably have prevented."
school desegregation decree. This case does not present that question and we therefore
do not decide it.
402 U.S. at 23.
84 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

39-46 (1969). "A small minority of Federal Judges ... have indicated by their past judicial
actions that they will not, where school desegregation . . . cases are concerned, discharge
their responsibilities impartially." Id. at 40. See also V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 243-77
(1971); J. PELTASON, FrSTY-EiGHT LONELY MEN (1961); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term,
supra note 13, at 81; Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of
The Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. Rxv. 1069, 1087-89 (1966); Note, Judicial Behavior
in the Fifth Circuit,73 YALE L.J. 90, 93-95 (1963).
85 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 266; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1289-98 (1970).
86 Cf. Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962): "The educational
system that is thus compulsory and publicly afforded must deal with the inadequacy
arising from adventitious segregation; it cannot accept and indurate segregation on the
ground that it is not coerced or planned but accepted." See RACIAL ISOLATION, supra
note 2, at 245; Seder, supra note 36. There is ample Supreme Court authority for an
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This rule has its analogue in the traditional tort principle that holds a
man liable for harm done by an instrumentality under his control.
No liability would attach, however, if the harm were unavoidable-that
is, impossible or unduly costly to prevent. In Learned Hand's classic
statement of the rule, the defendant would be liable unless the "burden
of adequate precautions" exceeded the probability of injury that
might occur multiplied by the gravity of that injury.87 Under such reasoning, the state should be absolved of responsibility for imbalance only
where it can show that greater balance is impossible or that the cost
of achieving it exceeds the risk of harm created by the imbalance.
In a determination of whether the costs of avoidance exceed the
risk of the resulting wrong, in a case of racial discrimination under the
fourteenth amendment, the applicable legal standard requires the state
88
to show a "compelling state interest" in order to justify its conduct.
This "new equal protection" test, while admittedly vague, provides a
doctrinal framework within which the courts can gradually supply consistent content. In applying this standard in contexts other than school
desegregation, courts have invariably found alternative, nondiscriminatory means of accomplishing the legitimate ends sought by the state.
Consequently, a state has never succeeded in showing its interest to be
approach that disregards motive: "[N]o state may effectively abdicate its responsibilities
by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may
be. It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal protection of the law that it
was done in good faith." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961). In a recent case, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that where a town dispenses
municipal services in a manner that deprives the black community of equal treatment,
the fourteenth amendment is violated even though no discriminatory motive is shown:
In order to prevail in a case of this type it is not necessary to prove intent, motive or
purpose to discriminate on the part of city officials. We feel that the law on this point
is clear, for "equal protection of the laws means more than merely the absence of
governmental action designed to discriminate; .. . we now firmly recognize that the
arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights
and to public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme."
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, No. 29013, at 2 (5th Cir., Mar. 27, 1972) (en banc) (emphasis in
original), aff'g 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), citing Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).
87 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The liability of
a barge owner for damages caused by his escaped, unguarded barge was determined by
Judge Hand's calculus of risk, in which legal responsibility is the function of three variables: (1) the probability of injury occurring (P), (2) the gravity of the injury if it does
occur (L), and (3) the burden of adequate precautions against it (B). When B > P X L,
there is no liability.
88 E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAsRV. L. REv. 1065, 1087-

1131 (1969). "This higher burden requires that a state show not only that its objective
could not be attained by a measure which did not draw racial distinctions, but also that
the public interest involved outweighs the detriments that will be incurred by the affected
private parties." Id. at 1103.
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compelling. 9 In the school context, however, while the burden on the
state would be heavy, it would not be insurmountable since it is often
impossible or extremely impracticable to construct a school system without racial imbalance.
If the compelling state interest standard were employed to determine
government responsibility, the court's inquiry would be identical with
that which should properly be made in formulating a remedy once
government responsibility is established 9 0- whether a compelling state
interest precludes greater balance. The following section suggests
criteria to guide the court in answering this question.
B.

Balancing Under the Compelling State Interest Test: Countervailing Costs

The essence of the desegregation suit is the quest for equal educational opportunity. If, however, the state demonstrated that the overall
quality of edcuation would suffer if desegregation were attempted, then
under the compelling state interest test, desegregation would be
avoided. 91 Moreover, other legitimate state interests are often affected by
a massive integration order. In a determination of whether the compelling state interest burden was met, the following costs would be relevant.
ag E.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 894 U.S. 802 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618 (1969).
90 "mhe nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Cf. Note, supra note 10, at 609:
"The duty to ease racial imbalance in public schools and the appropriate relief a court
might order are inseparable." See also Fiss, supranote 23, at 598.
91 Under the compelling state interest test, the decisions that seem correct for each of
the various educational possibilities that would arise from any decision to integrate
may be charted as follows. (D = decreased quality of education, U = unchanged quality of
education, I = increased quality of education, N = no integration, Y = integration.)
Effect on white students
D U D I D U I U I
Effect onblackstudents
D D U D I U U I I
Decision
NNNN
Yj-Y YY
This is obviously the difficult category. Assuming that deprivations are the result
largely of white discrimination, it does not seem inequitable to accept some compensatory
redistribution in favor of blacks if absolutely necessary; however, there is obviously a limit
to this that will be a question of fact in each case. Cf. United States v. Jefferson County
Bd.of Educ., 872 F.2d 836, 900 (5th Cir. 1966); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515
(D.D.C. 1967). Contra, Kurland, supra note 57, at 590-91: "It is highly doubtful in my
mind that the elimination of excellence is an appropriate price to pay for the symbol of
equality." See also Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unrequal World: Equality for the NegroThe Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. R-v. 368 (1966); McAuliffe, School De.
segregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination,57 VA. L. REv. 65 (1971).

t Where the actual quality of education would be unchanged after integration, the
decision should be to integrate because of the positive social aspects, beyond the strictly
educational effects, arising from integration.
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1. TransportationCosts. The cost of busing is the strongest and most
frequently asserted countervailing interest. 2 Although busing may be
burdensome, the Supreme Court noted in Swann that approximately
thirty-nine percent of all public school children took buses to school
in 1969-70.93 Busing therefore should not be considered undesirable
simply because the destination is an integrated school. Busing, the
Court held, should be precluded when it would "either risk the health
'94
of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process.
In Swann, the Court upheld a district court order requiring busing
trips that had a one-way duration of thirty-five minutes. Challenges to
the reasonableness of trips of shorter duration seem unlikely to succeed,
barring extraordinary circumstances. 5 Whether the Court will uphold
longer trips remains uncertain. 96 It is clear, however, that the Constitution should not be held to require any transportation plan that keeps
children on a bus for a substantial part of the day, consumes significant
portions of funds otherwise spendable directly on education,97 or involves a genuine element of danger to the safety of the child.98
92 In response to the antibusing hysteria sweeping the country, President Nixon proposed
in March, 1972 a moratorium on all court-ordered busing for the purposes of "racial
balance." N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1972, at 14, col. 1 (city ed.). If proposed implementing
legislation is enacted, the prospects for achieving integrated education will be diminished
considerably, although the constitutionality of such legislation is questionable. Cf. Lee V.
Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), afJ'd, 402 US. 935 (1971). See also Hunter v.
Erikson, 893 US. 885 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 869 (1967); United States v.
Klein, 80 US. 128 (1872).
93 402 US. at 29. Testifying before a Senate committee, HEW Sec. Elliot Richardson
recently noted that the number of students bused has increased by only two percent in
the last two years. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1972, § 4, at 3,col. 3.
94 402 U.S. at 80-81.
95 Cf. Brewer v. School Board, Nos. 71-1900, 71-1901, at 4 (4th Cir., Mar. 7, 1972) (en
banc) (average trip of thirty minutes upheld as "not substantially different" from Swann).
96 In Winston-Salem/Forsyth Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1227 (1971), Chief
Justice Burger, sitting as Circuit Justice, indicated that an average time of three hours
daily would be a "patent violation of Swan."
97 In Brewer v. School Bd., Nos. 71-1900, 71-1901 (4th Cir., Mar. 7, 1972) (en banc),
the court held that where a desegregation plan requires transportation, the school board
is under an obligation to provide it. The required expenditure of $3.6 million ($8 million
for capital outlays) for transportation during the first year was held to be reasonable, using
Swann as a standard. Id. at 8-10. Cf. Eaton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 30 F.
Supp. 78, 79 (E.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1890 (4th Cir., Apr. 26, 1972) (en banc) (cost of
thirty-eight new buses held not unduly burdensome). See also Singleton v. Jackson Munidpal Separate School Dist., 332 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Miss. 1971) (state government enjoined
from withholding funds needed for busing).
98 In Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., No. 71-8028 (5th Cir., Feb. 23, 1972), the
court ordered the pairing of two schools for integration purposes although it would require
the moving of children across an intersection that had been the scene of 147 accidents
during the previous year. Judge Wisdom dismissed the school board's fears by recommend-
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Existing busing practices in an area are another factor to be considered in determining the propriety of a busing order.9 9 A school board
that has been using large-scale busing to transport students to segregated schools can hardly be heard to object to a similar amount of
busing to transport students to integrated schools. In Swann, the Court
found justification for the busing order in Charlotte in the school
board's prior use of busing-with an average one-way trip of more than
an hour-to maintain segregation. 100 Similarly, in the Richmond case,
Judge Merhige was able to identify numerous examples of massive busing over long distances and over district lines employed prior to his order
for the purpose of keeping the schools separate. 10 1
2. Elimination of Neighborhood Schools. Integration frequently
results in the elimination of neighborhood schools. This change may
be considered a cost of integration since it hampers extracurricular
activities, parent-teacher associations, and walk-in schools and interferes with associational preferences among members of a residential community. Some of these factors can lower the quality of education. 10 2
It would appear inequitable, however, to place great weight on the
white community's desire to retain a neighborhood school when the
existence of the white neighborhood can usually be traced to acts of
ing the installation of a variety of safety measures, such as traffic lights, an overpass, or
crossing guards. See also Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 36-38 (1971).
99 Numerous post-Swann cases have used the amount of busing previously existing in a
system as a factor in determining how much busing should be ordered to overcome imbalance. E.g., Winston-Salem/Forsyth Ed. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1225 (Burger,
Circuit Justice, 1971); United States v. Watson Chapel School Dist. No. 24, 446 F.2d 933,
937 (8th Cir. 1971); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 444 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (6th Cir. 1971);
Davis v. Board of Educ., 328 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
In his proposed busing moratorium, President Nixon relegated busing to the status of
a remedy of last resort. The proposal appears to acknowledge, however, that prior use of
busing is a relevant consideration in formulating a desegregation plan:
[S uch a plan could not require increased busing of students in the sixth grade or
below. If a plan involved additional busing of older children, then: (a) It could not
be ordered unless there was clear and convincing evidence that no other method would
work; (b) in no case could it be ordered on other than a temporary basis; (c) it could
not pose a risk to health or significantly impinge on the educational process; (d) the
school district could be granted a stay until the order had been passed upon by the
court of appeals.
118 CONG. RFc. H2214 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972) (emphasis added).
100 402 U.S. at 30.
101 No. 3353, at 15-16, 177-84 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1972). "The Court finds that the transportation contemplated will in no event be for a longer distance or time than the maximum
now utilized by the respective county defendants." Id. at 184. The maximum busing required in the Richmond opinion was one hour. Id. at 238. In Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the court rejected busing of "forty minutes or more" in a
system that had not previously transported students.
102 See Glazer, Is Busing Necessary?, CoM ENTARY, Mar., 1972, at 47-49. But see Carter,
supra note 23, at 506-07.
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public and private discrimination.103 Moreover, judicial approval of
neighborhood schools encourages residential segregation by those
whites who wish to remain in the public schools, yet avoid integration.
Since a significant component of the deprivation inherent in segregated
schools is the stigmatization resulting from the white majority's imposition of the segregation, imbalance flowing in part from black associational desires renders interneighborhood integration less compelling, particularly if the schools in black neighborhoods are not significantly inferior. It is, however, often difficult to ascertain the true preference of a majority of the black community.1 04
3. Alteration of Existing School Districts. The school district is the
primary unit for both financial and administrative control; integration requiring the alteration or elimination of existing districts can
be a cost of considerable importance. Since the local property tax is
gradually being eliminated as a basis for distributing educational
funds,10 5 the argument for local fiscal control is decreasingly persuasive.
If the concept of decentralized control is viable, on the other hand,
existing school district lines should not be so readily disturbed. 00
Particularly where districts coincide with preexisting municipal or
county units, there are valid administrative reasons for their preservation.107 An opposite conclusion would follow, of course, where district
103 Compare Judge Merhige's response in Richmond: "[W]hile the assignment of pupils
to neighborhood schools is undoubtedly both a sound and desirable concept, it cannot in
this Circuit be approved if residence in a neighborhood is denied to Negro pupils solely
on the ground of color, as this Court has found." Civil No. 3353, at 13 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5,
1972). See also note 12 supra.
104 In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969), aff'd,
423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970), a group of blacks unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in
opposition to black plaintiffs' demands for integration, claiming that integration would
destroy black neighborhood schools. The recent black political convention voted overwhelmingly against the use of forced busing to achieve integration. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1972, at 38, col. 4 (city ed.). Much of the black opposition to integration is grounded in
the desire for black local control and should not be confused with the antibusing reasons
generally proffered by the white community. Bell, Integration, a No Win Policy for
Blacks?, INuquALrry iN EDucaATio, Mar., 1972, at 39-40; Kirp, Community Control, Public
Policy and the Limits of the Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1970). See generally Diamond,
Reform of the Government of Education:A Resolution of the Conflict Between "Integration" and "Community Control", 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1005 (1971); The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, supra note 13, at 79 n.30.
105 See note 58 supra.
108 The desire to retain local control was accepted as one of the justifications for avoiding greater integration in United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575,
580 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 821 (1971). See generally THE ComMJNrry SCHOOL CONTROVEasY (A. Levin ed. 1969); Diamond, supra note 104.
107 Most other public services are dispensed through the local governmental unit, and
the administrative burdens involved with creating a distinct unit for educational purposes
can be significant.
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lines have been discriminatorily created or maintained. 08
4. Potentialfor White Noncompliance. In any desegregation plan,
the danger of subversion by white resistance is always present. As a
general proposition, white recalcitrance must not be a factor in determining constitutional rights;' 09 the Supreme Court has made clear that
white anger, unhappiness, or threats of violence should not be allowed
to thwart the attainment of equal rights.".0 If, however, the constitutional goal is integrated education, and as a practical matter white ffight
renders this goal unattainable, it cannot be ignored."' Courts must continue to patrol against the many practices,"12 such as subsidized private
schools, that have been employed by whites to avoid desegregation, and
white noncompliance must be discouraged by every means possible.
Certainly, the result of a decision such as Keyes, ordering desegregation for one part of a city but not for another, can serve only to encourage noncompliant whites to move to a part of the city where their
children can attend all-white schools free of judicial interference. The
costs of white noncompliance are real, however, and must be dealt with
by courts in determining whether further integration is attainable.
These are some of the more significant costs that must be considered
by courts when determining whether a school board has demonstrated
108 President Nixon's busing moratorium proposal stated that "[s]chool

district lines

must not be ignored or altered [by the courts] unless they are clearly shown to have been
drawn for the purposes of segregation." 118 CONG. REc. H2214 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972).
109 E.g., Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 536-37 (1963); Brewer v. School Ed., No. 171900, at 2-3 (4th Cir., Mar. 7, 1972) (en banc). But see Pittsburgh School Dist. v. Zebra,
287 A.2d 870 (Pa. Com. Ct. 1972) (preliminary injunction halting desegregation granted
where white students were severely harrassed at a black school).
110 E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Ill Cf. Yarborough v. Hulbert-West Memphis School Dist. No. 4, 329 F. Supp. 1059,
1054-67 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1524 (8th Cir., Mar. 27, 1972). The district court
took note of the danger of whites fleeing if the "tipping point" was reached and therefore
adopted a plan that would approach a seventy-thirty white-black ratio in all schools.
"The problem here, however, is not the actual percentage figures in the plan so much as
it is the workability, or prospects of success, of the plan." Id. at 1066 (emphasis in original).
See also United States v. Scotland Neck City Ed. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575, 581 (4th Cir. 1971)
(en banc), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 821 (1971) (fear of white flight as justification for not
seeking maximum integration "entirely consistent with and may help implement the
Brown principle'; Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 805-06 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Davis v.
Board of Educ., 328 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (E.D. Ark. 1971). See generally A. Bicm., THE
SuRamu CouRT AxD Trm IDFA oF PRoGREss 136-37 (1970).
112 E.g., Griffin v. County School Ed., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (state tuition grants to segregated private schools); Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971) (sale of
public school to be used for segregated private school); Gilmore v. Montgomery, 337 F.
Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (use of public parks and facilities by segregated private schools);
Green v. Connelly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), afd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 92 S.Ct.
564 (1971) (tax exemption for segregated private schools).
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a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the existence of racial imbalance. No formula has been devised by which these factors may be
weighted. Unfortunately, the nature of the problem is not conducive to
mathematical precision. Only by dealing explicitly with these factors
can courts develop a line of precedents that will eventually allow trial
courts consistently to identify a compelling state interest for racial imbalance." 3 The development will very likely follow the rigorous standard established in Swann:
The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward,
inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose
burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot
be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are
being made to eliminate the dual school systems." 4
CONCLUSION

In the absence of Supreme Court guidance in defining a standard of
government responsibility in the school desegregation context, courts
have applied a broad array of legal tests. Although the fourteenth
amendment should be applied consistently, the obligation to integrate
schools has thus far been restricted to those areas where the courts have
broadly construed the idea of government responsibility.
The deprivation resulting from school segregation is as real in a
Northern city where the neglect or indifference of the state has allowed
racial imbalance to occur as it is in a Southern city where it was once
mandated by law. In one sense, an approach that requires a school board
maintaining an imbalanced system to show a compelling interest to
justify the imbalance merely restates a complicated problem in simple
terms. In another sense, however, it provides a framework for a consistent development of legal criteria while allowing sufficient flexibility
for courts to achieve reasonable results in individual cases.
Robert I. Richter
113 Cf. Comment, supra note 63. But see Note, Alternatives to Case-by-Case Attacks on

School Desegregation,16 How. L.J. 575 (1971).
"4 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).

